Federal Pipeline Regulator Rarely Enforces Safety Rules, New Analysis Shows

While attorneys for a major Canadian pipeline company argue that federal regulators hold sole authority in regulating pipelines across the country, a recent report argues that national-level oversight is not strict enough to prevent oil spills and other safety concerns.

Enbridge, which operates the controversial Line 5 pipeline, is currently embroiled in legal battles with state officials over efforts to shut down a four-mile segment of the pipeline operating in the Straits of Mackinac, where Lake Michigan and Lake Huron meet.

Opponents have referred to the more than 70-year-old pipeline as a ticking time bomb, citing a previous spill from Enbridge’s Line 6B and multiple anchor strikes which dented the dual pipelines and damaged structural supports as causes for concern. Enbridge maintains that the pipeline is operating safely as it seeks to replace the two segments operating in the Straits of Mackinac with a new segment housed inside a maintenance tunnel beneath the lakebed.

In 2020, Michigan Gov. Gretchen Whitmer revoked the pipeline’s easement to operate on the bottomlands of the Great Lakes, citing environmental concerns and the state’s responsibility to preserve natural resources in the public trust. However, Enbridge successfully argued in court that federal law prevents states from placing safety regulations on interstate pipelines, with the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration holding exclusive authority over pipeline safety regulations. Whitmer has appealed the decision.

However, the Great Lakes Business Network and the University of Michigan Law School Environmental Law and Sustainability Clinic called the effectiveness of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration into question in a study released earlier this week.

In examining the administration’s safety records from the past 16 years, the study found that the regulatory body has never permanently shut down a pipeline, no matter how severe a leak or rupture has been.

It also found that of the 10,024 recorded pipeline incidents, the administration only issued 50 notices of proposed safety orders, which notify operators of conditions that create a pipeline integrity risk which could harm public safety, property, or the environment. These notices also propose specific measures that an operator must take to address the identified risk.

Of those 50 notices – one of which was later withdrawn – only seven saw the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration taking proactive steps to address the risk of a pipeline failure, and only two saw the administration set requirements for the operator to reduce the pressure in the pipeline, the study notes.

While these notices are not the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s only tool, the study says that they are among the strictest and serve as a good proxy for examining the agency’s lack of proactive enforcement action.

“PHMSA’s own records show that it hardly ever takes action to stop a rupture – its entire enforcement posture toward pipeline safety is reactive and dangerous,” David Weaver, the author of the report, said in a statement. “Only 50 enforcement actions out of 10,000 plus incidents from the federal agency responsible for protecting the nation from oil spills – it is no wonder why there are hundreds of pipeline ruptures every year.”

Additionally, the study found that the administration has never issued a notice of proposed safety order against Enbridge, while there were more than 1,068 spills across Enbridge’s system between 1993 and 2013.

A 2017 report from the National Wildlife Foundation based on Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration data found that Line 5 alone has spilled more than a million gallons of oil across its length since 1968.

In analyzing the notice of proposed safety order data, the Great Lakes Business Network and U-M Environmental Law and Sustainability Clinic found that the administration’s enforcement efforts were “almost exclusively reactive to ruptures, leaks, and other failures,” and that the agency’s enforcement heavily relies on pipeline operators to self-report issues due to a lack of staffing and funding.

As of February 17, the agency’s Office of Pipeline Safety employed 207 federal inspectors and 456 state inspectors, charged with regulating nearly 3,000 companies operating 3.3 million miles of pipeline, 183 liquefied natural gas plants, 396 underground natural gas storage fields and 8,528 hazardous liquid breakout tanks. According to the agency, its oversight programs have decreased the amount of serious pipeline incidents by 12% over the last 20 years.

However, the study pointed to several instances where operators failed to report prior leaks and failures, and to maintain records required by federal regulations.

“Another factor contributing to the lack of reliability from industry self-reporting is that often the operators themselves are often unaware of failures, leaks, and ruptures, relying on residents to find and report them,” the study notes.

Even if the agency had proper funding, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration also faces strong influence from the pipeline industry and a revolving door between industry and regulators, with the study pointing to the administration’s deputy administrator of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration and its chief counsel’s connections to the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America, a pipeline industry organization.

The study also pointed to a lack of insulation from outside politics, noting that a presidential administration concerned with energy prices can prompt the agency to drop its enforcement activities.

It cites an analysis from the Pipeline Safety Trust, an advocacy group, which argues that the Trump administration’s decision to limit enforcement of pipeline safety measures in line with its 2025 energy emergency order allows operators to forgo required safety work without having to worry about the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration intervening.

As for its oversight of Line 5 and Enbridge, the study notes that the only enforcement action taken to shut down the pipeline came from a Michigan court ruling, requiring the company to shut down Line 5 “as immediately as possible” and provide further information about an anchor strike in the Straits of Mackinac which damaged a support for Line 5’s east segment.

Enbridge spokesperson Ryan Duffy told Michigan Advance in an email that the company is taking several measures to ensure the pipeline’s safety in the straits. While the dual pipelines provide redundancy, Duffy said other protections include 24/7 digital leak protection monitoring, cathodic protection to prevent corrosion, automatic isolation valves and a decreased operating pressure within the dual pipelines.

“The Enbridge Straits Maritime Operations Center (ESMOC) is staffed 24/7 by a team monitoring and coordinating numerous safety measures in place in the Straits,” Duffy said.

In its conclusion, the study offers several recommendations for improving enforcement measures within the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, including increased independence, laws establishing a 5-year waiting period for pipeline industry members to work as regulators and improved budget and staffing.

The study also advises Congress to allow states to set their own safety regulations on pipelines, so long as they are at least as stringent and protective as federal regulations.