In recent weeks, former Bush speechwriter Marc Thiessen has been on a public relations campaign defending the efficacy of waterboarding, going so far as to say that the torture technique sanctioned by the Bush administration is not only safe, but is in line with the teachings of the Catholic Church.
On Tuesday, in an interview with “Fox News,” John Yoo, the former Justice Department attorney who was the principal author of legal memoranda that cleared the way for CIA interrogators to waterboard “war on terror” detainees and subject them to other brutal torture techniques, asserted that waterboarding was harmless.
In his defense of the practice, Yoo cited the thousands of US servicemen who have undergone SERE training and said, “we don’t think it amounts to torture because we would not be doing it to our own soldiers otherwise.”
However, a previously unreleased internal Department of Defense (DoD) memo, summarizing a review of the Navy SERE program in late February – early March 2007, reveals that there was fierce criticism within the DoD of the Navy SERE school in North Island, San Diego, for being the only SERE facility to still use waterboarding in its training program.
The memo, obtained by Truthout, stated that the use of waterboarding left students “psychologically defeated” and impaired in the ability to develop “psychological hardiness.”
The attempt to remove waterboarding from Naval survival school training goes back to at least 2005, which was also the period when then-Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Steven Bradbury was fashioning a series of legal opinions that approved waterboarding as an “enhanced interrogation” technique. Bradbury cited the use of waterboarding on numerous SERE students over the years, supposedly without reported serious injury or prolonged mental harm, as relevant in approving it as not meeting the legal criteria for torture.
The Joint Personnel Recovery Agency memo from Fort Belvoir, Virginia, is marked “For Official Use Only,” and addressed to the headquarters of the departments of the Navy and the Marine Corps, and copied to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs. US Air Force Col. Brendan G. Clare signed it.
SERE stands for Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape, and SERE schools exist across the military services, but the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) is considered the “Executive Agency” for all the SERE schools. The aim of SERE “Code of Conduct” training is to prepare US military personnel for possible capture and torture by an enemy that does not follow Geneva conventions guidelines.
The Clare memo stated, in part:
3. Area of Concern: The JPRA official stance is that the water board should not be used as a physical pressure during Level C SERE training. This position is based on factors that have the potential to affect not only students but also the whole DoD SERE program. The way the water board is most often employed, it leaves students psychologically defeated with no ability to resist under pressure. Once a student is taught that they can be beaten, and there is no way to resist, it is difficult to develop psychological hardiness. None of the other schools use the water board that leaves the San Diego school as a standout.
In an attachment to Colonel Clare’s memo, “Observations and Recommendations,” JPRA indicates that the waterboard technique as used in the SERE schools is “inconsistent” with the JPRA philosophy that its training and procedures be “safe, effective” and provides “a positive learning experience.”
The water board has always been the most extreme pressure that required intense supervision and oversight because of the inherent risks associated with its employment…. Forcing answers under the extreme duress of the water board does not teach resistance or resilience, but teaches that you can be beaten. When a student’s ability to develop psychological resiliency is compromised… it may create unintended consequences regarding their perception of survivability during a real world SERE event. Based on these concerns and the risks associated with using the water board, we strongly recommend that you discontinue using it [underlined in the original].
According to a “Talking Paper” attached to the memo, JPRA addressed its concerns regarding waterboarding with the commander of the San Diego SERE program going back to 2005. The paper indicated that waterboarding continues at the California SERE School because it is “an emotional issue with former Navy POWs.” The talking paper, dated October 11, 2007, was incisive regarding criticism of the North Island program. Colonel Clare indicated that three of the six SERE schools had been visited by Congressional staffers, and that “It’s only a matter of time before Navy SERE School (W) is visited and the Navy has to explain and justify the continued use of this instructional method and JFCOM/JPRA is asked, why it was allowed to continue.”
Furthermore, the paper indicated that JPRA felt it had “exhausted all efforts” at lower levels of bureaucracy, and indicated the issue should be brought to the attention of officers at the JFCOM [Joint Forces Command] Flag level, with an eye to preventing “an embarrassing situation” for the military, and “discretely prevent a risky and documented ineffective training technique.” As of October 2007, there were no DoD restrictions on physical pressures applied during SERE training, including the waterboard.
Colonel Clare indicated that he specifically brought his concerns to Air Force Gen. Lance L. Smith, Commander, JFCOM, in December 2006, but was told that lacking anything in writing, “I should ‘stay in my lane.’” (General Smith left JFCOM in November 2007 and is now retired.)
The Navy SERE school in Brunswick, Maine, discontinued the use of waterboarding in its training curriculum after a SERE psychologist found via “empirical medical data … elevated levels of cortisol in the brain stem caused by stress levels incurred during water boarding.” Cortisol is a stress hormone released by the adrenal glands as part of the body’s fight-or-flight mechanisms. Excess cortisol can lead to chronic stress, impaired cognitive abilities, thyroid problems, suppressed immune functioning, high blood pressure, and other health problems.
The OPR Report and the PREAL Manual
A great deal has been written about the purported safety of waterboarding. Recently, former Vice President Dick Cheney has advocated its continued use, and told ABC “This Week” that he was “a big supporter of waterboarding.”
The issue came to prominence again when the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) report was released February 19. The report capped a four-and-a-half-year-long investigation into misconduct by Justice Department attorneys in the writing of memos and other written materials used to justify the use of harsh interrogation techniques ordered by the White House and the CIA.
In each of the released three drafts of the OPR report, there is a short section, introduced without comment, on a May 7, 2002, SERE “Pre-Academic Laboratory (PREAL) Operating Instructions” manual. We do not know when or how the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) obtained this manual, but it’s possible that it was supplied by the same means that other JPRA/SERE material was delivered to OLC.
The August 2002 torture memos drafted by Yoo and former OLC attorney Jay Bybee, as well as memos written in 2005 by former OLC acting head Bradbury, had relied in part on assurances from the SERE program and personnel that the waterboard technique was not physically harmful, was used upon SERE students, albeit at a lesser degree of application, and was, therefore, with medical monitoring, safe to use.
The PREAL document had noted, as OPR pointed out, that SERE training was different from “real-world conditions.” Under the SERE techniques, the SERE trainee could “develop a sense of ‘learned helplessness’” during training.
The interrogator must recognize when a student is overly frustrated and doing a poor job resisting. At this point the interrogator must temporarily back off, and will coordinate with and ensure that the student is monitored by a controller or coordinator. (Pages 40-41 of the OPR Final Report.)
Despite the warnings that, even at SERE training school level, the dangers of waterboarding (and other SERE techniques) required monitoring, with the implication that the dangers were even worse in “real-world conditions,” neither the OPR report, nor the memorandum written by Associate Deputy Attorney General David Margolis, who reviewed the final OPR report, indicated that SERE itself had decided the dangers were too great to include waterboarding in its training. It is not known when waterboarding was ceased at the bulk of the SERE schools, but it appears that it had been discontinued for the reasons described above at all but the North Island SERE school by the time Bradbury was writing his OLC opinions, which like the Yoo/Bybee memos approved the use of waterboarding.
According to a related SERE document, dated September 26, 2007, written by SERE Human Factors Chief Gary Percival Ph.D., “Waterboarding consists of immobilizing an individual and pouring water over their face to simulate drowning.” It elicits a gag reflex in the victim, “making the subject believe his or her death is imminent.” The document noted that when waterboarding is “poorly executed,” it “can cause extreme pain and damage,” including broken bones from pulling against restraints. As a result, and in line with risks associated with other SERE techniques, at SERE school both medical and psychological monitoring is considered vital to protect students from injury. Dr. Percival indicated that JPRA did not support use of waterboarding in SERE training, as it “does not teach resilience or resistance,” and “risks promoting learned helplessness.”
As the SERE techniques were “reverse-engineered” by SERE psychologists and CIA contractors, John Mitchell, Bruce Jessen, and possibly others, for use by the CIA in early 2002 (or late 2001), the requirements for the presence of both medical and psychological personnel at the interrogation site was written into the torture protocols. Besides possible physical damage or even death, the presence of psychologists, in particular, was meant to provide monitoring capacity to prevent the acquisition of a state of “learned helplessness” in the prisoner.
A 2001 document written for the Human Factors Directorate of JPRA, “Scientific Implications for Code of Conduct Training Across the Captivity Spectrum,” co-written by Dr. Percival and Dr. J. Bruce Jessen, described learned helplessness:
When students feel they are faced with unsolvable problems, their performance and retention are significantly reduced. Training models that induce learned helplessness are worse than no training at all.
According to the American Heritage Medical Dictionary, learned helplessness (LH) is “A laboratory model of depression in which exposure to a series of unforeseen adverse situations gives rise to a sense of helplessness or an inability to cope with or devise ways to escape such situations, even when escape is possible.”
The original experiments on LH, performed by former psychologist and former American Psychological Association president Martin Seligman, in the mid-1960s, and published in the Journal of Experimental Psychology with Steven Maier as “Failure to Escape Traumatic Shock,” exposed dogs to a situation where they were faced with inescapable electrical shocks. Within a short period of times, the dogs could not be induced to escape the situation, even when provided with a previously taught escape route. Drs. Seligman and Maier theorized that the dogs had “learned” their condition was helpless. The experimental model was extended to a human model for the induction of clinical depression and other psychological conditions.
According to New York Times reporter Scott Shane, James Mitchell was an admirer of Dr. Seligman’s writings on LH, and told him so at a meeting at Dr. Seligman’s home in December 2001, where “a small group of professors and law enforcement and intelligence officers gathered … to brainstorm about Muslim extremism.” CIA psychologist Kirk M Hubbard accompanied Dr. Mitchell.
According to the OPR report, in late July 2002, OLC attorneys received a psychological assessment of Abu Zubaydah “and a report from CIA psychologists asserting that the use of harsh interrogation techniques in SERE training had resulted in no adverse long-term effects” (p. 62). In the CIA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) report on the use of “enhanced interrogation techniques,” (EITs) released last year, the proposal to use SERE-like techniques on Zubaydah, and other prisoners, originated in the CIA’s Counter-terrorism Center and the Office of Technical Services (OTS). The report stated:
CIA’s OTS obtained data on the use of the proposed EITs and their potential long-term psychological effects on detainees. OTS input was based in part on information solicited from a number of psychologists and knowledgeable academics in the area of psychopathology….
OTS also solicited input from DoD/JPRA regarding techniques used in its SERE training and any subsequent psychological effects on students.
Moreover, the CIA OIG report remarked that the subsequent Yoo/Bybee memos of August 1, 2002 were “based, in substantial part, on OTS analysis and the experience and expertise of non-Agency personnel and academics concerning whether long-term psychological effects would result from use of the proposed techniques.”
It is not known if Dr. Hubbard, or Drs. Jessen or Mitchell, or even psychologist Dr. R. Scott Shumate, who accompanied Mitchell to the Thailand interrogation of Zubaydah in April 2002, were among those in the CIA who guaranteed “no adverse long-term effects” for the torture techniques proposed. Dr. Shumate was the chief operational psychologist for the CIA’s Counter-terrorism Center at the time, and is reported to have left the Zubaydah interrogation in protest over the use of SERE techniques.
Dr. Seligman denied that he had any connection with the implementation of the CIA’s torture program. In a recent article, he described his association with the SERE program:
I gave a three-hour lecture sponsored by SERE (the Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape branch of the American armed forces) at the San Diego Naval Base in May 2002. I was invited to speak about how American troops and American personnel could use what is known about learned helplessness to resist torture and evade successful interrogation by their captors. This is just what I spoke about.
I was told then that since I was (and am) a civilian with no security clearance that they could not detail American methods of interrogation with me. I was also told then that their methods did not use “violence” or “brutality.” James Mitchell and Bruce Jessen were present in the audience of between 50 and 100 others at my speech, and that was, to the best of my knowledge, the sum total of my “assisting the CIA.”
The San Diego base is the site where the controversial continuation of waterboarding students in SERE training continues. Dr. Seligman did not describe under what circumstances he was told he could not be given details about the US interrogation program or even why the subject came up.
Dr. Seligman now says he is “grieved and horrified” over the use of the learned helplessness theories in the construction of the CIA’s torture protocols. Yet, when I wrote to Dr. Seligman in August 2007 to ask, “what is your position on the use of your research by others, and on psychologists involved in military/CIA interrogations under the current administration?,” Dr. Seligman replied: “The only ‘position’ I am comfortable staking out is ‘Good science always runs the risk of immoral application. It goes with the territory of discovery.’”
The Margolis Memo, SERE and the Waterboard
In a memo to the attorney general vacating the decision of the OPR report to charge OLC torture memo authors Yoo and Bybee with “professional misconduct” and refer them for bar discipline, Margolis supplied his own analysis of the use of the SERE material. He described SERE training as “relevant to the threshold question of whether everyone subjected to the waterboard suffers severe physical pain or suffering.” Furthermore, Margolis stated that Yoo and Bybee relied on the psychological assessment of Zubaydah in order to assess if Zubaydah “would suffer severe mental pain or suffering as a result of the waterboard.”
Margolis felt the Yoo/Bybee memo relied too much on the SERE experience, and not enough on the monitoring of Zubaydah or others by CIA medical personnel and psychologists, or on the CIA’s psychological assessment of Zubaydah. But the evidence of the recently revealed 2007 JPRA memo on waterboarding shows that the SERE schools themselves had serious doubts that waterboarding could be made safe, even under controlled conditions. This doubt had led them to campaign vigorously within the Pentagon bureaucracy to end the use of the waterboard at the remaining SERE school where it was used.
There is no indication in his memo that Margolis was aware of this situation, nor made an attempt of his own to investigate the facts behind the CIA or OLC assertions regarding waterboarding and its use by SERE.
As for the Zubaydah psychological evaluation, it is clear the evaluation was written specifically to get permission for waterboarding, and not to undertake a serious psychological evaluation of the prisoner. The report is amateurishly and hastily written, and is mostly a compilation of claims about Zubaydah that have since been refuted or even dropped by the government, e.g. that Zubaydah was a top al-Qaeda official, that he wrote the al-Qaeda resistance manual etc.
While Margolis could say that both Yoo and Bybee were not competent to judge the validity of the psychological evaluation of Zubaydah, and that they relied on the statements of the CIA psychologists in the case, nevertheless, it is notable that the psychological evaluation was only produced after Yoo had indicated in a July 13, 2002, letter to CIA acting General Counsel John Rizzo that consultation with “experts” would constitute the “due diligence” necessary to contest a charge of “specific intent” in a torture case. A psychological evaluation could be considered such a consultation with experts. Yoo also cited as examples of such “due diligence” surveys of professional literature and “evidence gained from past experience.”
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