More Questions For Cheney
t
r u t h o u t | Letter
Wednesday 17 September 2003
Representatives Kucinich, Maloney and Sanders are members of
the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International
Relations.
The Honorable Dick Cheney
Vice
President
Office of the Vice President of the United
States
Eisenhower Executive Office Building
Washington, DC 20501
Dear Mr. Vice President:
On July 21, 2003, we sent a letter to you inquiring about
your role in the dissemination of the disinformation that Iraq purchased uranium
from Niger. We asked you ten questions relating to your direct personal visits
to CIA's Iraq analysts; your request for an investigation of the Niger uranium
claim that resulted in an investigation by a former U.S. ambassador, and your
several high-profile public assertions about Iraq's alleged pursuit of nuclear
weapons. To date, we have not received your response to our inquiries.
Since our last letter to you, you spoke at the American
Enterprise Institute and once again made reference to the already proven false
assertion that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. In order to
legitimize the war, you cited findings listed in the National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE), some of which had been refuted months before you cited them.
Most recently, on September 14, 2003, after almost a year
of repeating the claim, you finally admitted the inaccuracy of your previous
assertions on Iraq's nuclear capabilities when you appeared on Meet the Press.
The chronology shows that you knew or should have known that the claim was false
when you first made it on Meet the Press in March 2003. We would like to inquire
as to why your admission took so long to be made publicly. We would also like
answers to our previous questions about your role in the dissemination of the
nuclear uranium claim.
I. Concerning "unusual" personal visits by the Vice
President to CIA analysts.
According to The Washington Post, June 5, 2003, you made
"multiple" "unusual" visits to CIA to meet directly with Iraq analysts. The Post
reported: "Vice President Cheney and his most senior aide made multiple trips to
the CIA over the past year to question analysts studying Iraq's weapons
programs."
These visits were unprecedented. Normally, Vice
Presidents, yourself included, receive regular briefings from CIA in your office
and have a CIA officer on permanent detail. In other words, there is no reason
for the Vice President to make personal visits to CIA analysts. According to the
Post, your unprecedented visits created "an environment in which some analysts
felt they were being pressured to make their assessments fit with the Bush
administration's policy objectives."
On 'Meet the Press' on Sunday September 14, 2003, you
dismissed The Washington Post article by suggesting that your frequent trips to
the CIA were because of a longtime interest of yours in the field of
intelligence. You also denied that your visits to the CIA had any impact on the
changing of intelligence:
"In terms of asking questions, I plead guilty. I ask a
hell of a lot of questions. That's my job. I've had an interest in the
intelligence area since I worked for Gerry Ford 30 years ago, served on the
Intel Committee in the House for years in the '80s, ran a big part of the
intelligence community when I was secretary of Defense in the early
'90s…Shouldn't be any pressure. I can't think of a single instance. Maybe
somebody can produce one. I'm unaware of anywhere the community changed a
judgment that they made because I asked questions."
Questions:
1) How many visits did you and your chief of staff make to
CIA to meet directly with CIA analysts working on Iraq?
2) What was the purpose of each of these visits?
3) Did you ever meet with CIA analysts working on other
intelligence matters, such as Al Qaeda?
4) Did you or a member of your staff at any time request
or demand rewriting of intelligence assessments concerning the existence of
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq?
II. Concerning a request by the Vice President to
investigate intelligence of Niger uranium sale, revealing forgery one year ago.
This alleged sale of uranium to Iraq by Niger was critical
to the administration's case that Iraq was reconstituting a nuclear weapons
program. During the period of time you reportedly paid visits to CIA, you also
requested that CIA investigate intelligence that purported to show Iraqi pursuit
of uranium from Niger, and your office received a briefing on the investigation.
According to The New York Times of May 6, 2003, "more than a year ago the vice
president's office asked for an investigation of the uranium deal, so a former
U.S. Ambassador to Africa was dispatched to Niger."
The ambassador "reported to the CIA and State Department
that the information was unequivocally wrong and that the documents had been
forged," according to the Times. Indeed, that former U.S. Ambassador, Joseph
Wilson, wrote in The New York Times, July 6, 2003, "The vice president's office
asked a serious question. We were asked to help formulate the answer. We did so,
and we have every confidence that the answer we provided was circulated to the
appropriate officials within our government."
Moreover, your chief of staff, Mr. Libby, told Time
magazine this week that you did in fact express interest in the report to the
CIA briefer. Our understanding is that Standard Operating Procedure is that if a
principal asks about a report, he is given a specific answer.
On Meet the Press on Sunday September 14, 2003, contrary
to Ambassador Wilson and Mr. Libby, you denied receiving Ambassador Wilson's
findings in February, or March of 2002. You also denied sending Ambassador
Wilson to look into the claim.
"I don't know Joe Wilson. I've never met Joe Wilson... I
get a daily brief on my own each day before I meet with the president to go
through the intel. And I ask lots of question. One of the questions I asked at
that particular time about this, I said, "What do we know about this?" They take
the question. He came back within a day or two and said, "This is all we know.
There's a lot we don't know," end of statement... And Joe Wilson -- I don't who
sent Joe Wilson."
Questions:
5) Who in the office of Vice President was informed of the
contents of Ambassador Wilson's report?
6) When did you personally become informed of Ambassador
Wilson's findings?
7) If the staff who took your question said, "This is all
we know. There's a lot we don't know", why did you continue to use the shaky
uranium claim in your public statements over the past year?
8) What efforts were made by your office to disseminate
the findings of Ambassador Wilson's investigation to the President, National
Security Adviser, and Secretary of Defense?
III. Speech by the Vice President to the American
Enterprise Institute on July 25, 2003
In a speech to the American Enterprise Institute on July
25, 2003, you read from several sections of the October 2002 National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE). You said that the Administration could not ignore
the findings in the NIE because doing so would be irresponsible. You said:
Those charged with the security of this nation could not
read such an assessment and pretend that it did not exist. Ignoring such
information, or trying to wish it away, would be irresponsible in the extreme.
And our President did not ignore that information -- he faced it... Against this
background, to disregard the NIE's warnings would have been irresponsible in the
extreme. And our President did not ignore that information -- he faced it, and
acted to remove the danger.
You cited the following sections of NIE as findings the
President could not ignore:
"Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons, as well as
missiles with ranges in excess of U.N. restrictions. If left unchecked, it
probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade... Since inspections
ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its chemical weapons effort, energized its
missile program, and invested more heavily in biological weapons; in the view of
most agencies, Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program... Iraq is
continuing, and in some areas expanding, its chemical, biological, nuclear and
missile programs contrary to U.N. Resolutions."
What is concerning about your speech is that in your
attempt to legitimize the cause for war with Iraq, you cited intelligence listed
in the National Intelligence Estimate that had already been refuted before you
spoke. Even more disturbing is that it was your office, the Office of the Vice
President, that learned of the false uranium story seven months before the NIE
was written and issued in October 2002.
Furthermore, questions have been raised about the intent
of the drafting of the NIE document. Former CIA-analyst Ray McGovern, in an
article printed in The Miami Herald on August 8, 2003 wrote:
Start with the fact that there was no NIE before the
decision for war last summer. Such decisions are supposed to be based on the
conclusions of NIEs, not the other way around. This time the process was
reversed... The marketing rollout for the war was keynoted by the vice
president, who in a shrill speech on Aug. 26 charged, "Saddam has resumed his
efforts to acquire nuclear weapons." A NIE was then ordered up, essentially to
support the extreme judgments voiced by Cheney, and its various drafts were used
effectively to frighten members of Congress into voting to authorize war.
Because it appears as if the NIE may have been drafted so
as to support certain claims for the war in Iraq, using it as a supporting
document for intelligence that the President "could not ignore" is misleading
and irresponsible.
9) Since your address to the AEI was delivered several
months after the nuclear uranium claim had been disputed, on what basis did you
make the claim that the President "could not ignore" the false nuclear findings
in the NIE?
IV. Assertions by the Vice President and other
high-ranking members of the Administration claiming Iraqi nuclear weapons
program.
The President's erroneous reference to the faked Niger
uranium sale in his State of the Union address was only one example of a pattern
of similar assertions by high-ranking members of the administration, including
you. The assertion was made repeatedly in the administration's campaign to win
congressional approval of military action against Iraq.
For instance, you said to the 103d National Convention of
the Veterans of Foreign Wars on August 26, 2002, "they [the Iraqi regime]
continue to pursue the nuclear program they began so many years ago... we now
know that Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons... Should
all his ambitions be realized... [he could] subject the United States or any
other nation to nuclear blackmail."
In sworn testimony before the House Armed Services
Committee, just weeks before the House of Representatives voted to authorize
military action against Iraq, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld testified on
September 18, 2002:
"He [Saddam]... is pursuing nuclear weapons. If he
demonstrates the capability to deliver them to our shores, the world would be
changed. Our people would be at great risk. Our willingness to be engaged in the
world, our willingness to project power to stop aggression, our ability to forge
coalitions for multilateral action, could all be under question. And many lives
could be lost."
Questions:
10) Since your address to the VFW occurred nearly 7 months
after Ambassador Wilson reported his findings to the CIA and State Department,
what evidence did you have for the assertion that Iraq was continuing "to pursue
the nuclear program" and that Saddam had "resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear
weapons"?
11) Since the Secretary of Defense testified to Congress
that Iraq was "pursuing nuclear weapons" nearly 8 months after Ambassador
Wilson's briefing to CIA and the State Department, what effort did you make to
determine what evidence the Secretary of Defense had for his assertion to
Congress?
Further refutation of the authenticity of the forged Niger
documents came from IAEA Director General ElBaradei, when he reported to the
U.N. Security Council on March 7, 2003: "These documents, which formed the basis
for reports of recent uranium transactions between Iraq and Niger, are in fact
not authentic. We have therefore concluded that these specific allegations are
unfounded... we have found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of
a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq." Yet on March 16 -- nine days afterwards --
you again repeated the unfounded assertion on national television (Meet the
Press, Sunday, March 16, 2003). You said:
"We think Mr. ElBaradei frankly is wrong," and "We believe
[Saddam] has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons."
On September 14, 2003, after almost a year of repeating
the nuclear claim, you finally retracted your position on Iraq's nuclear
capabilities when you appeared on Meet the Press. When asked about your March
16, 2003 Meet the Press interview in which you accused Mohammed ElBaradei of
being wrong about Iraq not having reconstituted its nuclear weapons program, you
said:
"Yeah. I did misspeak. I said repeatedly during the show
weapons capability. We never had any evidence that he had acquired a nuclear
weapon."
Question:
12) What accounts for the length of time it took you to
publicly retract the Niger uranium claim?
We hope you will take the opportunity to answer these
questions about your role in the dissemination of false information about Iraq's
nuclear program to justify the war in Iraq. We look forward to a response.
Sincerely,
Dennis J. Kucinich
Ranking Minority
Member
Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats and
International
Relations
Carolyn B. Maloney
Member
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats and
International Relations
Bernie Sanders
Member
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats and
International Relations
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